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THE BATTLE FOR RUBBER IN BENIN 
 
ABSTRACT. Nigerian rubber exports expanded rapidly during the Second World War “battle for 
rubber”. This was achieved by overcoming obstacles to greater exploitation of both wild and planted 
rubber. I outline Nigeria’s wartime experience, focusing on the Benin region that dominated 
smallholder production after the war. British policies initially restricted rubber planting. After Japan 
occupied Southeast Asia, Britain encouraged maximum production. Late in the war, officials 
struggled with the planting boom that had occurred. The war was a period of both continuity and 
change for Benin, and exposed the limited capacity of the colonial state. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
By 1942, Japanese conquests in Southeast Asia accounted for more than 80% of pre-war 
global rubber production.
1
 The Allies called upon producers in Africa, Latin America, and 
South Asia to expand natural rubber production for the war effort. The Nigerian response was 
remarkable, and is shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. From 1941 to 1943, Nigerian rubber 
exports more than tripled. 
How was this achieved? Projections for 1943-44 provide one estimate of the sources of 
supply. Officials expected 22% of Nigerian production to come from the formerly German 
“Cameroons Plantations,” 19% from the United Africa Company’s Pamol holdings at the 
Jamieson River in Benin and near Calabar, 1% from the J.A. Thomas estate at Sapele, and 
26% from smallholders concentrated in Benin, Warri, and Owerri.
2
 The remainder would 
come from wild rubber – 19% Funtumia from the Western Provinces and 12% vine rubber 
from the middle belt, Cross River, and Cameroons. Wild rubber made up 25% of Nigerian 
exports in 1942, 29% in 1943 and 11% in 1944 before falling below 2% at the end of the 
war.
3
  
In this paper, I provide a narrative of rubber production in Nigeria’s Benin region during 
the Second World War. Before 1942, the Colonial Office discouraged planting, worried that 
Nigerian rubber undermined British interests in other colonies. Japanese occupation of 
Southeast Asia initiated the “battle for rubber,” and Britain sought maximum production from 
Nigeria. Once it was clear the Allies would win the war, the government fought to contain the 
unexpected planting boom. Although rubber was produced throughout southern Nigeria, I 
focus on the Benin and Warri Provinces, shown in Figure 2. Smallholders in Benin and Warri 
dominated Nigeria’s post-war rubber sector. It is in this region that the war is most important 
for understanding later Nigerian rubber production.  
Despite the rapid increase in output, several obstacles hindered expansion of Nigerian 
rubber production. These barriers reflected the heterogeneous incentives, motives, and 
capacities of the key participants. The Colonial Office, initially concerned Nigerian rubber 
would harm other colonies, pivoted to focus on maximum production after the loss of 
Southeast Asia. The Government of Nigeria pursued contradictory aims of development and 
raw materials for Britain. Specific departments had divergent objectives; the Forestry 
                                                          
1
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Department’s mandate to preserve forest resources was inconsistent with the Agriculture 
Department’s promotion of agriculture.  
African producers pursued their own interests. Smallholders in particular faced high 
labour costs, uncompetitive buyers, and a rising cost of living. They found it more profitable 
to produce low-quality rubber than the higher quality grades sought by the government. 
Expatriate trading firms and rubber estates focused on profits. Trading firms were 
inexperienced and wary, and, like smallholders, found it profitable to ship low-grade rubber. 
While production expanded relatively smoothly on larger estates, these struggled to maintain 
labour supplies during and after the war. State efforts to expand output, the experiences of the 
key participants, and the obstacles to expansion are the focus of this paper.  
Related literature 
This narrative fills gaps in the history of rubber production. Excepting work on rubber’s 
initial difficulties and its effects on land tenure,
4
 all historical work on rubber in Benin is 
contained in broader pieces on the region.
5
 Writers have paid limited attention to wartime 
tropical rubber production, particularly in Africa.
6
 
I contribute, first, to a literature asking “What was the effect of the Second World War on 
African economies?” Many colonies faced government controls, scarce imports, inflation, 
forced labour, and conscription.
7
 The burden of intensified production fell heavily on the 
labouring classes.
8
 These pressures were not limited to Allied colonies. Spanish and 
Portuguese Africa also experienced coerced cultivation of crops, forced labour, and food 
scarcity, as well as entrenchment of undemocratic rule and distraction of the international 
humanitarian lobby.
9
  
Was the war a watershed? One view claims the war initiated greater intervention in 
African economies. Post-war intrusions such as marketing boards and requisitioning owed 
their origins to wartime pressures.
10
 Trade was transformed, and the output of some products 
increased permanently.
11
 Another perspective stresses continuity between the pre-war and 
post-war periods. Martin situates the war in a longer African depression.
12
 Recent work, then, 
identifies both continuity and change. The Malawian agricultural extension service, for 
example, revised its strategies, but not its aims.
13
 Byfield provides a review.
14
  
In Benin, the war brought continuity and change. Direct restrictions on tree planting were 
undermined. Firms became familiar with rubber and continued the trade afterwards. Farmers 
gained experience and the position of smallholders was solidified. Conversely, forest 
reservation hindered planting before the war and remained afterwards. Throughout, the 
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Nigerian government could not prevent African smallholders from producing the low-quality 
grades that were most profitable.    
Second, I contribute to a literature asking “What limited the capacity of colonial states?” 
Lacking resources and blinded by prejudices and misinformation, colonial governments 
relied on local elites.
15
 Projects failed due to inadequate preparation and overconfidence.
16
 
Conflicting objectives hobbled colonial states. The goals of raising living standards, securing 
raw materials, and supplying a market for manufactures often clashed.
17
 Colonial responses 
to problems were piecemeal. The war heightened these difficulties. Colonial states strained to 
motivate producers facing declining terms of trade. Labour demands for mines and public 
works undermined crop production, and sterling balances were a persistent challenge.
18
 States 
struggled to increase production of necessities, and resorted to rationing schemes that local 
elites manipulated.
19
  
In Benin, the state contended with conflicting interest groups, and worked to provide 
incentives to both producers and traders. External constraints, particularly Colonial Office 
demands and scarce imports, restricted the tools available. The state lacked knowledge of 
local conditions, and so its interventions harmed producers, while its decrees were resisted or 
manipulated. Throughout, the state responded to established facts. Actions were poorly 
coordinated, leading to contradictory efforts. Despite these limitations, state intervention 
spurred a dramatic increase in production. 
 
2. THE BATTLE FOR RUBBER DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
Before the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia, wartime disruption of the global rubber 
market was limited. The International Rubber Regulation Agreement continued to restrict 
output and set prices.
20
 Signed in 1934, this arrangement supported prices by restricting 
supply. Britain remained in the scheme to secure dollar earnings.
21
 Production lagged behind 
capacity in many producing countries, in part because of the disincentive effects of excess 
profits taxes.
22
 At a meeting in August 1941, the International Rubber Regulation Committee 
rebuffed proposals by the British Ministry of Supply to suspend output restrictions.
23
  
In the United States, American chemical companies began the war with no clear idea how 
to manufacture a synthetic alternative.
24
 From 1940, the American Rubber Reserve Company 
centralized purchases as the United States stockpiled rubber.
25
 Technical assistance, 
equipment and capital poured into suppliers in the Western Hemisphere, particularly Brazil.
26
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These efforts turned urgent after the Japanese offensives of December 1941. Ceylon and 
India were the only Far Eastern territories that escaped Japanese occupation, and India was a 
net importer of rubber in 1941.
27
 Authorities in Ceylon increased output through a 
combination of higher prices, direct appeals to producers, tax breaks, and incentives to 
slaughter-tap existing trees.
28
 American efforts to obtain greater supplies of natural rubber 
from the Western Hemisphere and Africa focused on higher prices, and were aided by the 
maturing of trees in Liberia.
29
 The International Rubber Regulation Committee continued to 
exist, but suspended restriction in 1942 and permitted unlimited new planting in Ceylon and 
India.
30
 In 1943, the Colonial Office decided rubber regulation would not continue after the 
war.
31
 
The Ministry of Supply coordinated British control of raw materials.
32
 Its main tools 
included import licensing and state purchasing, which prevented private buyers from 
competing with Ministry demands.
33
 In particular, the Ministry’s Rubber Control Board made 
all purchases through the London rubber market.  Import and export restrictions directed 
rubber towards the war effort and conserved foreign exchange.
34
 The Rubber Control set 
grades and f.o.b. prices.
35
 The Government of Nigeria set ex-scale prices.
36
 Shipments were 
graded in the UK before distribution to manufacturers.
37
 The Combined Raw Materials Board 
ensured cooperation with the United States. From 1942 to 1945, Ceylon accounted for 55% 
of natural rubber exports, Africa 25%, Latin America and Oceania 18%, and India less than 
2%.
38
  
Nigeria produced 5.3% of natural rubber within the British sphere of Africa and 
unoccupied Asia, and 4.1% of output within the Allied sphere including the Americas.39 
Rubber came mostly from two sources. First, wild rubber from the native Funtumia elastica 
was usually exploited by mobile gangs of tappers. Funtumia could only be tapped a few times 
per year.
40
 Second, planted rubber came mostly from Hevea brasiliensis. This came 
originally from Brazil. Hevea surpassed Funtumia on smallholdings after 1914 due to its 
higher yield, better wound response, and more rapid growth. Hevea matured in seven years. 
Smallholdings were often tapped daily after the war, excepting a “wintering” period during 
which trees could not be tapped. Rubber was collected by cutting grooves into the bark and 
allowing the latex to flow into a container such as a snail shell. This latex was then 
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coagulated, rolled into thin ribbed sheets, and smoked. Apart from these “ribbed smoked 
sheets,” Nigerian rubber was generally lump or crepe. Lower-quality lump was less labour-
intensive, produced by simply cleaning the coagulated latex. Lumps and poor-quality sheet 
could be re-milled in order to produce crepe rubber. 
 
3. AMBIVALENCE AND RESTRICTION, 1937-42 
 
Ambivalence 
The Colonial Office was initially concerned African production could undermine quantity 
restrictions imposed by the International Rubber Regulation Agreement. In 1940, the 
Colonial Office remarked on Nigeria’s “striking” increase in exports, and asked the Nigerian 
government for a report on planting.
41
 Officials felt Nigeria was typical of colonies outside 
the agreement that were “parasitic on the scheme,” benefitting from high prices without 
curtailing output.
.42
  
The Colonial Office had additional concerns. Firms such as the British Bata Shoe 
Company (Bata) and the United Africa Company (UAC) had leased African holdings for 
tapping.
43
 This circumvented Britain’s policy of preventing non-Nigerians from obtaining 
permanent interests in land.
44
 This, officials feared, could undermine the control exercised by 
local chiefs who were essential to indirect rule.
45
 Bata began buying hides, cotton and rubber 
in Nigeria during the 1930s, and its leases amounted to some 50,000 trees by 1940.
46
 The 
Colonial Office heard that the UAC wished to lease all African rubber in the country.
47
 
Smallholders let out several of Nigeria’s “large number of small and widely scattered” 
African plantations before the war. These leases comprised 11,000 trees in the Eastern 
Provinces and probably more in the Western Provinces.
48
 
By contrast, the Nigerian Agricultural Department did not wish to harm the industry, due 
to revenue concerns and the depressed state of trade. The Government claimed the industry 
was “of substantial value to the African planter,” as the price for palm produce had remained 
low through the 1930s.
49
 The Agricultural Department believed rubber slowed destruction of 
forest cover, converted un-cleared bush into valuable growth, and could stand a high export 
duty.
50
 Producers did not understand why palm oil was promoted despite low prices, while 
rubber was ignored. Agricultural Department policy was “neither to encourage nor to 
discourage rubber production but to give advice and assistance to farmers when asked.”51 
This included instruction in laying out plots, tapping and preparation, provision of planting 
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material, and allowing some planting in forest reserves. The Government of Nigeria 
supported this position, and the Colonial Office agreed. 
Restriction 
Despite this stance, coordination was imperfect, and two policies discouraged planting. 
First, forest reservation set land off limits to planting. Reserves favoured the timber industry 
and provided royalties to the state. Reserves covered half to two thirds of Benin Division on 
the eve of the war.
52
  These interfered with planters who, under “customary” rules, could 
plant anywhere in Benin. Reserves also checked the growth of larger holdings by powerful 
interests. In 1921, the Commissioner of Forests refused an application from the Oba (the 
traditional head of the local Native Authority) to extend his rubber plantations in two 
reserves, on the grounds that further clearing of trees would restrict water flow into the Ogba 
River.
53
 The UAC, similarly, found that the government would not consider a rubber 
plantation in a reserve in 1937. The District Officer felt that, since the Oba held the land on 
behalf of the people, it would be a “gross breach of trust” to lease it to a firm for a rubber 
plantation.
54
 
Because of the state’s limited capacity, enforcement was delegated, creating opportunities 
for corruption. In 1940, for example, one timber contractor accused a Forest Guard of aiding 
a man accused of illegally farming in the Ohosa Reserve to evade prosecution.
55
 Similarly, a 
petitioner complained in 1941 that a Native Authority agricultural assistant had “corruptly 
demanded” and received money from the planters in his village “in the name of the 
Government”.56  
The second policy limiting planting was the Permanent Crops Order (PCO), passed in 
1937. The Agricultural Department, fearing tree crops were locking up land needed for food 
crops, pushed the Native Authority to take this action.
57
 Further, the Oba opposed the 
appropriation of communal lands for private plantations.
58
 Under the order, no one was to 
plant any tree without the permission of the Village Council.
59
 Applicants required signatures 
from the odionwere (chief) and Oba.  
At first, objections were received, mostly in response to what the District Officer believed 
was “false propaganda” from planters’ associations that the order would be used to collect 
taxes. Once this was quashed, the order became popular.
60
 In the first few months, hundreds 
of applications were approved, with permits being treated as titles by the farmers.
61
 
Enforcement was delegated out of necessity, so the order was unevenly enforced. It was 
used mostly against strangers, especially those living in Benin City. Few local planters 
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bothered to obtain a permit.
62
 In 1941, urban residents complained of discrimination.
63
 The 
District Officer recognized these were based in fact, but that enforcement would require a 
costly and possibly corrupt staff of inspectors.
64
 In 1940, the Commissioner of Forests noted 
that permits had been issued in Forest Reserves. Recipients were, in some cases, 
prosecuted.
65
 By 1941, a backlog of applications had formed.
66
  
 
4. THE STATE AND THE BATTLE FOR RUBBER, 1942-44 
 
Efforts of the Agriculture and Forestry Departments 
 
An early 1942 telegram from the British government called upon Nigeria to achieve 
“maximum output of rubber both plantation and wild.”67 Three days later, the Agriculture and 
Forestry Departments issued circulars. Another circular was soon sent with instructions on 
finding and preparing wild rubber. Several others followed during 1942-43.
68
 These 
departments offered instruction to officers and to Native Authorities, whose employees 
trained locals in production. Three inspectors of produce and twenty five produce examiners 
in the Western Provinces were trained in April 1942 to prepare wild rubber, and similar 
training was conducted at Benin and Aba.
69
 Some European staff of the Agricultural 
Department devoted more than half their time to rubber at first, and many African staff were 
fully employed in rubber.
70
 By May, wild rubber was sold at the local “canteens.”71  
Later in 1942, the Forestry Department took over the wild rubber drive, leaving the 
Agricultural Department responsible for plantation rubber.
72
 This required reviving an 
industry abandoned decades earlier. Only a few elderly inhabitants had experience, and 
written records were sparse.
73
 The Forestry Department established buying organizations and 
erected smoke houses.
74
 Fees and licenses covering wild rubber were waived. In mid-1943, 
seven European Forest Officers and most of the African Forestry staff were almost entirely 
occupied by wild rubber, and forty six others had been engaged as rubber demonstrators and 
propagandists.
75
 School teachers were instructed to guide children collecting rubber during 
holidays.
76
 One consequence was destruction of Nigeria’s wild rubber. By the end of 1944, 
wild rubber output was declining.
77
 The 1945 report of the Agricultural Department admitted 
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“trees were worn out and vines destroyed. But the object was achieved, wild rubber being 
produced when the shortage of rubber was most acute.”  
Rubber took priority over other Agricultural Department Work.
78
 There were hundreds of 
small plantations to deal with, some no bigger than a garden.
79
 By May 1942, the Agricultural 
Department believed tapping on these Hevea farms was reaching full capacity.
80
 In July, the 
Agricultural Department began to survey Hevea plantings in Benin Province.
81
 The 
government encouraged tapping on Sundays, and shortening the annual rest period during 
which workers visited their families.
82
 Staff trained girls to assist smallholders in collecting 
latex, picking scraps, and other tasks.
83
 
Native Authorities assisted in buying. Lorries toured outlying villages each month. Native 
Authorities also trained rubber graders, organized tapping, established processing stations, 
supplied tapping knives, rollers, climbing ropes, and other equipment, and built 
smokehouses.
84
 A “Rubber Challenge” was organized for districts to compete in 
production.
85
  
 
Challenges for the government  
 
The state began the war unsure what could be expected for Nigerian rubber. Officials 
used pre-war exports and early twentieth century figures as guides.
86
 The Agricultural 
Department initiated surveys to determine the whereabouts of untapped trees and investigated 
stocks of coagulants and equipment. In 1943, T.J. Cumming and W. Richards traveled to 
West Africa as an expert “Rubber Mission” to investigate production.87 The Rubber Control 
instructed the Government of Nigeria that rubber of “any shape or form” was wanted, even 
rubber that washed up on the coast.
88
 Scientific staff investigated the suitability of untested 
species.
89
   
The government had to satisfy conflicting incentives of trading firms and African 
producers. An early challenge was the system of inspection and grading. Initially, produce 
inspection staff carried out unofficial grading at the request of firms. In July 1942, the 
Ministry of Supply informed the Government of Nigeria of new grades and prices that were 
adopted on a trial basis after consultation with representatives of the African territories.
90
 The 
Association of West African Merchants (AWAM) complained that local buyers could not 
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follow these grades, since no simple accurate tests for adulteration or moisture were 
available.
91
 Several shipments had been downgraded in the UK. Local agents were 
disgruntled in 1943.
92
 They did not trust their UK representatives or the Rubber Trade 
Association in London to make specifications that were comprehensible in West Africa.
93
  
The Governor proposed a simplified system that collapsed several grades together, 
allowing deductions for adulteration and moisture.
94
 This recognized the limited skills of 
colonial staff and local agents of trading firms. Similar suggestions were made by 
Daarnhouwer and Company and the AWAM.
95
 The Rubber Control feared these 
simplifications would lead buyers to purchase wild rubber at the lowest price, discouraging 
production. The Rubber Control had intended multiple grades based on adulteration and 
moisture content to discourage adulteration and ensure producers received compensation 
related to f.o.b. prices.
96
 The Ministry of Supply adopted an alternative proposal, under which 
shippers were relieved of responsibility for discrepancies between the contracted quality and 
what arrived in the UK, though those consistently shipping below the contracted grade could 
be removed from the list of approved shippers.
97
  
The remoteness of rubber production and coordination problems within the Colonial 
Office made changes difficult. The Rubber Mission found many up-country buyers were 
unaware of the Rubber Control’s quality guarantee in 1943. Others were suspicious of its 
powers to take action against shippers.
98
 In July, Colonial Office representatives met with the 
AWAM to discuss the possibility of inspection by the Produce Inspection Department, a 
second grading at the ports, and bulked shipping. Negotiations collapsed when the Rubber 
Control stated it would not accept the second grading as final.
99
 The compromise that 
emerged in 1942 remained until the end of the war. Government Produce inspection began in 
October 1943.
100
  
 
5. PRODUCERS AND THE BATTLE FOR RUBBER, 1942-44 
 
Tappers and smallholders 
 
Encouraging African producers proved difficult. Pamphlets written in English were 
unsuited to illiterate or non-English producers and staff.
101
 High prices were insufficient –
Africans needed “incentive goods”. In 1942, the government sought to obtain a variety of 
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these under Lend/Lease, mostly household goods and hardware.
102
 In Esan, gunpowder was 
an incentive good.
103
 The Rubber Mission worried higher rubber prices enabled producers to 
live by working less, raised prices of luxuries, and encouraged producers to hoard in 
anticipation of higher prices.
104
 The failure of subsidies in remote areas appeared to confirm 
these fears.
105
 Officials debated whether price increases would raise production.
106
  
Though the terms of trade for most Nigerians fell, rubber producers fared better; import 
prices between 1940 and 1944 were 80% higher than they had been from 1935 to 1939, while 
the price of RSS 1 sheet in London rose 97%.
107
 Still, Africans found the battle for rubber 
intrusive. Other wartime policies raised labour costs. Farm owners and communities with 
wild trees were required to tap them. Regulations enabled Residents (provincial governors) to 
order trees or vines that were not being fully exploited to be turned over to alternative 
tappers.
108
 Agricultural staff reported farmers who refused to tap trees; the government issued 
about 200 warnings to farmers in 1943.
109
 Compensation was to be paid only if the authority 
saw fit.  
For smallholders, these notices came as a shock. One owner complained that the person 
who reported his rubber was untapped did so maliciously.
110
 Another wrote that he was 
tapping his rubber, but the Resident informed him the three young boys he employed were 
insufficient, when eight to ten men would be needed.
111
 Others complained that the 
government had turned their plantations over to alternative tappers with no notice given.
112
 
Wild rubber was treated similarly. In 1942, the District Officer gave the people of Egoro 
permission to exploit untapped Funtumia on the Kukuruku side of the district boundary.
113
  
Africans resisted. Individuals served with notice would begin tapping, only to soon 
abandon it.
114
 At Ujogoa, farmers refused to show plantations to production assistants. 
Assistants not accompanied by policemen lacked authority.
115
 Labour shortages explain this 
resistance. Many men had left for the army or for large estates. With labour diverted to food 
production after the failure of the yam crop, farmers in Esan in 1943 were not able to obtain 
labour at 10s per month, the wage they stated they could pay.
116
  
Further, producers faced monopolistic buyers who often cheated them. Buyers routinely 
ignored ex-scale prices. Administrative officers did little to protect producers.
117
 Because up-
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country buyers feared reprisal from their parent companies if rubber was later de-graded, the 
firms most active in the wild rubber trade were those with only a few offices and free from 
fear of their superiors. Others offered prices one or two grades below what was actually 
bought.
118
 The Elders of Ekpoma, in Esan, complained that the UAC clerk there had offered a 
price below the official one and turned them out, refusing 200 sheets of rubber.
119
 He 
weighed small parcels on scales designed for larger amounts, and informed the District 
Officer that he rounded weights down to the nearest pound.
120
 Several producers refused to 
sell to local representatives of commercial firms unless an administrative officer was 
present.
121
 Middlemen, knowing they would face deductions at the buying centres, took these 
out of the prices they paid producers.
122
 Larger planters coped by combining into 
organizations, directly importing equipment, and directly exporting rubber.
123
  
 Producers faced scams and a rising cost of living. The “Rubber Health Maintenance Co” 
defrauded smallholders. Company representatives issued notices in 1944 that they had the 
right to inspect and treat plantations, threatening farmers that refusal to treat their plantations 
would lead to prosecution.
124
 Costs of living and nominal wages rose.
125
 There was a shortage 
of supplies such as formic acid and wire gauze.
126
 Officials did not treat smallholders’ 
demands for equipment favourably. When asking for assistance in acquiring knives and 
gauze, officials suggested that locally produced knives were excellent, and that producers 
could adequately strain latex using raphia in a perforated tin.
127
  Officials scolded farmers 
who asked for price increases that their cost of production was no more than 4d per lb, that 
“they were among the very few people to whom the war had brought abnormal profits,” and 
that they were the only rubber planters in the empire not subject to excess profits tax. If they 
pressed for a revision, it might go against them.
128
 Farmers complained tappers and transport 
were scarce and that their views were not forwarded beyond the production office.
129
  
The government saw the quality of rubber produced by Africans as a problem. The 
proportion of high grade rubber fell throughout the war.
130
 Africans adulterated rubber with 
resinous latex.
131
 Shipments arrived in the UK containing pieces of wood or palm kernels.
132
 
Much of the rubber arrived tacky, and articles made from it perished quickly. For Funtumia, 
this was because producers overheated it during preparation and left it to dry in the sun.
133
 
Smallholders’ “unnecessary large proportion” of low grade rubber impressed the Rubber 
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Mission.
134
 While capable of higher grades, farmers were satisfied with profits from lower 
quality rubber. Producers rolled latex into balls and dried it over a fire on a permeable 
platform exposed to the sun. This became tacky, would not dry properly, and could lose half 
its caoutchouc content before reaching the UK.
135
 Producers threw tree scrap in the same 
container as bark shavings and sold it for whatever price it could fetch. The Rubber Mission 
reported one farmer with an idle rolling machine; the effort needed to improve quality was 
not worth the better price.
136
 
The war prompted Hevea planting, despite only slight government encouragement.
137
 In 
Esan, one official estimated in 1943 that 1323 farmers had 605 acres of mature rubber, with 
roughly another 1,000 acres of young trees.
138
 In Kwale-Aboh, another official estimated the 
acreage under rubber had expanded from 660 acres before 1937 to 7067 by the end of 
1944.
139
 By 1948, some 25% of Benin Division was under rubber.
140
  
While officials believed this was an ill-informed price response, pressures towards land 
appropriation intensified during the war.
141
 The state confronted new planting in 1942. While 
officials supposed a large area of rubber in Malaya would be destroyed, they thought it was 
too early to consider long term projections.
142
 The Resident of Warri Province did not believe 
an acute land shortage was likely, but the possibility should be kept in mind. The people 
themselves were, in his view, mostly uninterested in the question.
143
 Other officials worried 
synthetic rubber would pose a threat after the war, or that planting diverted labour from 
production.
144
 The matter was dropped without a decision. 
Buyers 
 
Trading firms were unfamiliar with rubber and wary.
145
 Unanticipated losses in weight 
meant firms were “buying their experience.”146 Further, import controls raised costs. In 
October 1942, Bata complained that the differential between the ex-scale and f.o.b. prices 
was not sufficient to meet expenses. They claimed packing, overhead, transport, bank 
expenses and depreciation cost them 1.52d per lb, while the difference between the f.o.b. 
price net of duty and the ex-scale price was only 2d. Employees at the company’s Nigerian 
stations were demanding a cost of living allowance that would cause Bata to lose money on 
rubber.
 147
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The government and the Rubber Mission were not convinced the trading firms were 
innocent. The government believed shipments were delayed so that local agents could await 
instructions from their head offices. The UAC, for example, temporarily suspended 
shipments in July 1942.
148
 The Rubber Mission accused firms of giving little attention to 
supply board notices and failing to consult Forest Officers for advice.
149
 In January 1943, 
Paterson Zochonis had ceased buying, owing to the loss made on their first shipment, while 
C.F.A.O. refused to purchase certain grades.
150
 Several firms had ceased buying at many of 
their canteens in 1943.
151
 
Where firms could save money by trading in low quality rubber, they did. Many 
shipments arrived below the contracted grade. Shippers demanded maximum prices for cases 
shipped without a declared grade. Other cases were shipped as flake, on which no export duty 
was charged, only for shippers to demand higher prices when these were found to contain 
sheet on arrival.
152
 This duty was roughly 1d per lb on rubber exceeding 6d per lb in value in 
1941. This was raised to 2d per lb in 1942 and not removed until 1947.
153
 The UAC believed 
this particularly discouraged Africans, whose product fetched lower prices.
154
 One official 
proposed removing the duty as an “obvious solution,” but this did not occur.155 Officials 
chastised clerks in Esan for refusing to buy certain types of rubber in 1944.
156
  
Buyers also contributed to problems of rubber quality. Bata graded above the grade 
offered to them.
157
 Bata pursued this policy in other countries before the war to increase 
market share. During the war, it undermined the supply of usable material. It created rumours 
of corruption, as other firms suspected Bata had a preferential relationship with the Rubber 
Control.
158
 Though inspection was introduced in 1943, no regulations banned adulteration 
until 1945. The Bata agent at Benin purchased un-exportable rubber with the intention of 
creping it at Sapele. He surrendered 37 tons that proved impossible to process.
159
 
At buying centres, agents dried rubber on sheets of corrugated iron in the sun. This made 
it tacky.
160
 In 1944, a Bata buyer near Ekpoma was storing “considerable quantities” of 
steadily-deteriorating lump rubber on an earthen floor, while the agent for Thomopulos, a 
firm owned by Greek expatriates, was holding a large amount of sheet that was growing 
mouldy.
161
 Rubber packed in hessian became tacky, adhered to its packaging, and was 
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difficult to clean. Talcum powder for dusting was not available.
162
 Ground snail shells used as 
a substitute harmed the rubber.
163
 The sole European representative of Thomopulos in the 
Benin and Warri provinces defended a bad shipment by claiming it was impossible for him to 
personally supervise the buying stations, so that it was left to the company’s African 
employees.
164
 
Although it was possible to crepe rubber to remove moisture and refuse, there were only 
two creping plants available in West Africa.
165
 Even this small capacity was not fully used. 
The creping batteries owned by Pamol and Thomas at Sapele only ran two to four hours a day 
on off-grade rubber produced on those plantations. It was not profitable for the firms to crepe 
purchased rubber at the scheduled prices. In 1942, Thomas lost £372 creping 36.82 tons it 
purchased.
166
 By July 1944, Pamol’s creping battery was obsolete and Thomas’ broke down 
frequently.
167
 In 1946, the rollers were glass smooth and only embedded dirt more firmly in 
the crepe after repeated passes.
168
  
 
The estate sector 
 
Apart from former German holdings in the Cameroons, estates in Nigeria were mostly in 
Benin and Warri.
169
 These were the properties of Pamol Ltd, J.A. Thomas, and I.T. Palmer.
170
 
Thomas and Palmer were both Africans. These varied in size; the Rubber Commission 
anticipated Pamol would produce nearly 1,500 tons of rubber over the 1943-44 season, while 
Thomas would produce only 80.
171
 Production increased smoothly on these. By October 
1942, intensification presented few problems, and growers were “going all out.”172 Palmer 
faced the most difficulty. A “worn out property,” tappers made cuts wherever bark 
remained.
173
 Other estates were exempt from grading, while the government intentionally 
excluded Palmer after the plantation’s manager was dismissed and took legal action against 
the company.
174
 After the war, management remained “chaotic” due to a personal feud 
among the directors, labourers had left without due notice, and workers at Sapoba went on 
strike after non-payment of wages.
175
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Estates struggled to maintain labour supplies during and after the war. Employers 
believed workers only pursued agitation after the industry became important to the war.
176
 
Workers on the UAC’s Jamieson River estate staged a two day strike in January 1944. They 
demanded a cost of living increase and war bonus, in part because they wrongly believed 
workers at Sapele had received similar increases.
177
 A meeting with the manager resolved this 
temporarily, but in February workers’ delegates asked that money no longer be withheld as 
surety for tapping utensils.
178
 In May, workers launched an additional strike, and seven 
workers were tried under the Defence Regulations.
179
  
In 1944, the government launched an inquiry into conditions on African plantations. 
These were “so notorious” that many workers from Esan and Kwale were unwilling to accept 
employment except in Government or European concerns, necessitating recruitment from 
Iboland, Umuahia, and more distant areas.
180
 Typically, employees on African plantations 
worked from April until February, returning home during the period when the trees could not 
be tapped.
181
 Generally, they were only paid “ration money” until the end of the year. A 
worker who left early surrendered all arrears. The Labour Officer objected that estates could 
thus dictate terms, worsen living conditions, and take advantage of illiterate labourers who 
had could not record the amount owed them.
182
 Though he believed workers’ hours were 
reasonable, their daily wage of 3½d was “ridiculous.” African planters feared the government 
would impose minimum wages that would make rubber unprofitable. Labourers would not be 
motivated, they argued, unless they were paid by results. Further, desertions were frequent, 
and changes would make it easier for other employers to entice deserters rather than 
recruiting workers themselves.
183
 
These problems outlasted the war. In 1946, the UAC’s Jamieson River estate was grossly 
overcrowded.
184
 At Palmer’s Sapoba estate, the main camp was overfull, susceptible to rain, 
in disrepair, with a single usable pit latrine and poor kitchens.
185
 At Palmer’s Kwale estate, 
workers lived in mud houses, and the dispensary assistant was a former gardener without 
training. Workers were discontent over their cost of living allowance.
186
 Many labourers left 
rubber for timber after price controls were removed in 1946.
187
  
When the UAC let 67 workers go in November 1948, they demanded repatriation and 
leave pay. The manager asked for police protection.
188
 After a strike of the roughly 190 
workers at Palmer’s Kwale estate, an inspector reported on conditions there. Tappers worked 
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some 46.5 hours a week, while factory boys put in 70 hour weeks.
189
 Wives had been 
employed at 7d-8d per day for farm work, but were dropped as this was unprofitable. Many 
workers were juveniles under the care of elder employees. Absenteeism was high, as workers 
were torn between the estate and their own farms during peak seasons. No overtime was paid. 
Labour was fined “almost recklessly.” The nearest market was seven miles away. Labour was 
often paid late.  
 
6. THE END OF THE WAR, 1945-48 
 
The return to a free market 
 
At the end of the war, the state lacked resources to smoothly manage restoration of 
private trade and removal price controls. Despite the opening of the Far East, forecasts 
predicted demand would continue to exceed supply. The exception was low-grade rubber, of 
which the Colonial Office sought to end collection as rapidly as possible.
190
 The Board of 
Trade discontinued rubber purchases at the end of 1946. Private trade resumed on January 1, 
1947. This operated under exchange control, ostensibly to curb speculation. By 1948, a 
decline in Nigerian production had begun.
191
 In August 1947, the export duty was removed to 
alleviate the worst hardship for producers, and import duties on some inputs to rubber 
production were waived.
192
 
The system of grading again became a challenge. Firms such as Bata had shown that a 
trade in low-grade rubber could be profitable, undermining attempts to improve quality.
193
 
The government informed shippers that, after stocks held on March 15 1946 cleared, several 
low quality grades would become un-exportable.
194
 The Board of Trade wanted Nigeria to 
follow Rubber Marketing Association grades. The Governor did not believe African 
personnel of the Produce Inspection Department could be trained to recognize the small 
differences between these categories, especially as Nigerian rubber was produced by a 
multiplicity of smallholders, varying in quality “not only from sheet to sheet but often as 
between one part of a single sheet and another.”195 He proposed a simplified system that 
continued the wartime system.
196
 Though the AWAM opposed continued grading by African 
inspectors that they believed was not credible in England,
197
 the Governor prevailed, and 
government inspection and grading continued.
198
  
Other issues complicated the post-war transition. The government gave only three days 
notification for the cancellation of price schedules, leaving firms unable to buy until new 
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prices were known.
199
 Wild rubber subsidies were cancelled without notice.
200
 During 1946, 
“Bata Nationalised Industries,” Bata’s nationalized Czechoslovakian former affiliate, sent 
two representatives to Nigeria. They attempted to entice employees away from Bata, take 
over expiring plantation leases, and acquire stocks at inflated prices.
201
 Because formic acid 
was scarce, it was nearly impossible for smallholders to produce high-grade rubber in early 
1947.
202
 The UAC, after using its stocks for its own plantations, had no acid to sell to 
others.
203
  
Order in Council 26 of 1946 imposed a minimum wage of 10d per day for trained 
workers on rubber plantations. This was not binding on European estates, which paid 1s to 1s 
3d per day.
204
 In December, African planters complained they could not pay this, asking for a 
suspension until prices improved. Unlike European firms, they could not supplement their 
incomes with profits on imports. Officials were unsympathetic, proposing short grace 
periods,
205
 arguing the minimum wage would weed out inefficient firms,
206
 or suggesting it 
only imposed a light burden.
207
 Enforcement was suspended throughout 1947 and 1948 as the 
supply of acid did not improve.
208
 By September 1948, it was clear the order would be 
unenforceable except on larger estates.
209
  
In September 1945, the Agricultural Officer recognized production work was not 
improving quality and proposed ending these activities.
210
 In October, almost the entire 
rubber staff was dismissed, with four assistants retained until the end of the year to distribute 
sieves and acid.
211
 Smallholders gained predominance, and quality declined.
212
 They 
possessed limited knowledge, had little machinery, used “dirty methods of production,” and 
frequently let out their plantations to others.
213
 Correspondence on low wages, low prices, 
and low quality continued into the early 1950s.
214
 
 
Planting and restrictions 
 
Throughout 1944, the Colonial Office re-considered planting restrictions. Officials feared 
that rubber expanded at the expense of food crops, and that the industry could not survive 
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international competition.
215
 Before the war, global capacity had exceeded consumption, and 
synthetic rubber would make competition particularly severe. Others within the Ministry of 
Supply worried labour and training costs would be the greatest problems.
216
 The Colonial 
Office considered restricting planting to certain areas.
217
  
The Agricultural Department believed price fluctuations and the lack of an internal 
market made rubber unsuitable for Nigeria.
218
 The Agricultural Department opposed planting 
restrictions. The only precedent was the PCO, which had “not been particularly 
successful”.219 Before the war, producers were willing to export if ex-scale prices were not 
below 3d per lb, and so they might weather post-war competition.
220
 The policy that emerged 
was gradual price reduction and propaganda discouraging planting.
221
  
In Benin, the PCO was not revived. In 1943, the Oba and Council forbade all planting 
after the end of the 1943 season. The District Officer sent a memo telling councils this 
restriction was “for your own good, in a few years' time the price of rubber will again be very 
low, and if you have used all your farm-land for rubber you will have neither money nor food 
... Tap all the rubber you can now, and save some of the money to make palm plantations 
after the war.”222 The ban was lifted in 1944.223 Peace and food shortages in 1945 and 1948 
re-opened discussion.
224
 Planters continued to resist restrictions, for example by concealing 
young trees.
225
 In 1946, the Agricultural Officer noted difficulties in enforcing restrictions 
when extension staff combined duties of “policeman” and “farmer's friend.” He suggested 
creating a uniformed corps of inspectors.
226
 Four of thirteen agricultural inspectors were 
converted to inspectors of permanent crops.
227
 The government also considered using the 
PCO to appropriate illegally-planted land to test the effect of rubber on food yields. This was 
never undertaken, due to concerns about fairness and legality, and because staff were 
unprepared for data collection.
228
 By 1948, the PCO was a dead letter.
229
 In 1951, the most 
recent information on the Permanent Crop Inspectors dated to 1949, and there was no 
evidence of attempts to enforce it.
230
 
In Warri, local authorities implemented new regulations based on the PCO. In 1944, the 
Senior Resident expressed alarm about the area planted to rubber.
231
 The Aboh and Kwale 
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 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 24 Nov, 1944: Memo by Senior Resident Warri. 
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Native Authorities had made rules prohibiting planting permanent crops without their 
permission, reserving the best land for food crops. The Itsekiri Native Authority had made a 
similar rule. Local authorities put in place other restrictions after the war in Ora, in the Ika 
clans, and at Ogwashi-Uku.
232
 
Like restrictions before the war, local authorities enforced these opportunistically. While 
Aboh and Kwale had passed the first restrictions, they did not enforce them until scared by a 
food shortage.
233
 The District Officer for Aboh reported in 1946 that “very large numbers of 
people” had planted “enormous quantities of rubber (for a fee paid to the Okparuku etc), 
without any reference to the District Officer.”234 Inadequate staff made this impossible to 
prevent. In Kwale, the District Court resisted prosecution of illegal planters, arranging 
adjournment of cases until the District Officer went on leave.
235
 The District Officer guessed 
that ten times as many individuals were planting surreptitiously as had received permits, 
hiding plantations by leaving bush between them and any major path or stream.
236
 When a 
count of rubber plantations was extended to reserved areas, it was taken by planters as if it 
were registration. A planter drove out one inspector in the prohibited area at Abedei on the 
grounds that the government had ordered all land to be planted with rubber, and that he was 
trespassing on the planter’s private land. The District Officer in Kwale, like his counterpart in 
Aboh, also advocated a full ban on planting. 
Forestry Department agents were accused of corruption.
237
 H.I. Aikhionbare, a permanent 
crops inspector in Benin, was suspended in 1947 pending police investigation of charges of 
extortion and official corruption.
238
 In 1945, an inspector in the Warri Province was charged 
with accepting a bribe. Though he “got away with it” when called before the authorities, he 
was relieved of duty, admitting he had been let off lightly.
239
 Africans continued to resist by 
bribing inspectors or planting in secret.
240
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
At the end of the war, Nigerian rubber output reverted towards pre-war levels. The 
decline on the return to a free market was especially noted among smallholders.
241
 Before 
1950, world prices did not provide a sufficient incentive for most producers, given their high 
costs. In Warri, labour was attracted instead to timber.
242
 The Korean War marked a reversal. 
The United States imposed a rubber blockade on China and stockpiled rubber. Prices rose. 
                                                          
232
 Rowling, “Notes”, p. 19-33. 
233
 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 3 June, 1946: Resident Warri to Senior DO Urhobo. 
234
 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 6 May, 1945: DO Aboh to Resident Warri.} 
235
 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 26/4/45: NA Agricultural Assistant to DO Kwale. 
236
 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 31 May, 1945: DO (Kwale?) to Resident Warri. 
237
 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 27 June, 1945: Agricultural Officer to DO Kwale. 
238
 BP 1470 Vol 2: PCBD: 11 June, 1947: Acting DO to Resident. 
239
 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 27 June, 1945: Agricultural Officer to DO Kwale, 10 Aug, 1945: Resident 
Warri to DO Aboh, and 30 Aug, 1945: DO Aboh to Resident Warri 
240
 Interview No. 4. 
241
 CO 657/62: Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and Industries for the years 1947-48. 
242
 CO 657/65: Annual Report of the Department of Marketing and Exports, 1949-50. 
THE BATTLE FOR RUBBER IN BENIN 
20 
 
Nigerian rubber exports surpassed their 1946 peak in 1950, and rose steadily from 1953 
through independence in 1960.
243
  
Wartime changes had set many of the conditions for this boom. International supply 
restrictions had collapsed. Farmers and trading companies had gained experience, and 
planting restrictions had fallen into disuse. Trees that had been planted before 1945 reached 
maturity. Still, this post-war response was not a complete rupture with the pre-1945 period. 
Forest reservation continued to restrict rubber production.
244
 Renewed tapping in Benin 
created a serious shortage of farm labour, and planting resumed in both Warri and Benin.
245
 
The Department of Agriculture worried that farmers were over-exploiting their plantations 
and doing little to maintain their trees.
246
 The quality of Nigerian rubber remained poor. 
Producers focused on quantity, and the prices offered by exporters fell into a range too 
narrow to induce improved quality.
247
 88 percent of production in 1952-53 fell into the lowest 
possible grade.
248
 Much of this rubber required cleaning and preparation before it could be 
classified as exportable. Exporters attempted to export the prohibited categories of scrap, 
lump and ball rubber without inspection.
249
 
Nigeria achieved a rapid increase in output during the Second World War despite 
multiple obstacles. The colonial state was weakened by its lack of information and resources, 
and by its need to pursue multiple, conflicting objectives. Producers were compelled, 
scammed, and exploited, but gained experience and a stock of capital for future use. Firms 
distrusted the new trade, initially lost money, struggled for labour, and chafed against grades, 
prices, and quality standards. Many of these difficulties survived into the post-war years.  
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Lagos Sapele Warri Burutu
Port 
Harcourt Opobo Calabar Victoria Tiko Total
lbs
1937 32,877 2,441,500 132,911 659,822 0 0 752,474 279,245 1,284,212 5,583,041
1938 1,032,836 2,383,413 59,077 399,733 444,013 40,071 1,000,608 480,355 1,182,866 7,022,972
1939 778,501 2,188,184 15,570 759,693 347,328 62,411 1,026,006 314,505 834,303 6,326,501
1940 312,092 3,487,046 44,644 393,865 445,922 20,035 812,146 801,974 184,162 6,501,886
1941 1,939,422 1,307,462 156,429 22,600 455,798 0 361,401 181,416 178,683 4,603,211
1942 7,574,300 1,881,505 602,581 2,848 908,337 0 1,031,969 2,526,316 407,456 14,935,312
1943 8,920,728 902,093 783,842 0 958,952 0 1,614,232 3,319,310 0 16,499,157
1944 11,189,644 2,276,510 357,259 112,767 677,674 0 2,053,404 4,237,686 0 20,904,944
1945 13,275,261 2,381,089 622,231 67,575 678,798 0 1,918,757 4,617,728 0 23,561,439
1946 16,433,798 904,596 828,897 419,482 579,378 0 2,277,464 4,196,093 0 25,639,708
1947 4,543,768 5,268,599 277,517 26,102 121,224 0 3,218,046 2,894,720 327,680 16,677,656
£
1937 740 55,700 2,328 17,227 0 0 10,250 4,293 31,173 121,711
1938 15,208 51,767 1,149 10,460 10,118 556 13,627 7,808 25,102 135,795
1939 17,912 41,089 382 18,139 10,135 1,080 14,917 5,792 18,662 128,108
1940 14,429 156,486 2,253 20,885 17,946 552 17,147 29,291 5,962 264,951
1941 126,145 61,266 10,214 1,523 23,246 0 8,440 7,112 7,268 245,214
1942 348,993 92,556 23,289 194 36,894 0 33,624 111,500 16,447 663,497
1943 421,136 49,197 33,794 0 43,157 0 85,468 161,554 0 794,306
1944 571,207 118,639 23,027 9,576 32,344 0 111,739 203,106 0 1,069,638
1945 706,343 123,834 28,638 5,679 33,262 0 102,585 219,866 0 1,220,207
1946 934,196 48,118 40,046 33,202 28,300 0 121,222 198,711 0 1,403,795
1947 223,279 195,638 10,187 2,330 6,037 0 99,056 125,192 15,185 676,904
Table 1. Nigerian rubber exports by port
Sources: NAUK, CO 647/55-61: Trade reports. Totals for 1932-36 are from NAUK, CO 852 320 9: War Trade. Commodities- Rubber, Nigeria. 12
June, 1940, Officer Administering the Government (OTG) to Dolobran gives the total for 1937 as 5,763,983.
Western Delta Eastern Delta
Eastern Provinces and 
Cameroons
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Figure 2. Divisions of the Benin and Warri Provinces 
 
Source: Division boundaries are from the Willink Minorities Commission. Nigerian 
boundaries are from www.diva-gis.org. 
